This article concentrates on a particular controversy during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa; the mass cancellation of flights to and from affected countries. This occurred despite authoritative advice against such restrictions from the World Health Organisation (WHO). During a public health emergency such as Ebola, the airplane sits at a site of regulatory uncertainty as it falls within the scope of two specialist and overlapping domains of international law; the WHO International Health Regulations (2005) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation. We explore how legal technicalities and objects, by promoting functional interactions between these two specialised regimes of law, were utilised to deal with this uncertainty. We show how the form and function of these mundane tools had a significant impact; assimilating aviation further into the system of global health security as well as instrumentalising the aircraft as a tool of disease surveillance. This encounter of regimes was law creating, resulting in new international protocols and standards designed to enable the resumption of flights in and out of countries affected by outbreaks. This article therefore offers significant and original insights into the hidden work performed by legal techniques and tools in dealing with regime overlap. Our findings contribute to the wider international law literature on fragmentation and enrich our understanding of the significance of relational regime interactions in international law.
INTRODUCTION
The 2014/2015 Ebola outbreak claimed over 11,000 lives in West Africa, 1 and devastated Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, the three most affected countries. 2 Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). 5 The WHO also issued temporary recommendations 6 that aimed to strike a balance between preventing the international spread of the disease, on the one hand, and avoiding 'unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade' on the other. 7 The WHO IHR Emergency Committee advised against travel restrictions with the exception of Ebola cases and their contacts. 8 ** The authors would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Kirk, Professor Joseph McMahon, Professor Jane Scoular, Dr Padraig McAuliffe, Professor Barry Rodger, Professor Elisa Morgera and two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable support and comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors are authors' own.
1 WHO, 'Ground zero in Guinea: the Ebola outbreak smoulders -undetected -for more than 3 months', available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/guinea/en/. outbreak. 15 Our approach is different; we investigate how the international regimes applicable to public health and aviation co-functioned during the Ebola outbreak and the impact these interactions had on producing certainty and coherence in the governance of infectious disease in air travel. Our account moves beyond the traditional lens of conflict and litigation which has tended to dominate traditional legal accounts of regime interactions. 16 We instead contribute to the growing literature on international law's 'relational interactions' 17 -the ways in which distinct regimes of law collaborate and ensure coherence through practice. 18 We demonstrate how ordinary legal tools and techniques -'legal technicalities' -were deployed to harmonize the norms, actors and processes of each regime in responding to the threat of international spread of disease via air travel. While legal technicalities could be dismissed as the uninteresting tools of lawyers, this work adds to an emerging socio-legal scholarship inspired by the work of Annelise Riles 19 and Mariana Valverde 20 which has shown how mundane legal tools exert their own agency, thereby making them worthy of greater attention. 21 We engage with the role of law by being, as Valverde puts it, 'simultaneously inside and outside law, simultaneously technical and theoretical, legal and socio-legal.' 22 In turn, we show how legal tools and artefacts facilitated what 15 See for example L. O. Gostin, 'Ebola: towards an International Health Systems Fund', (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2383&context=facpub. 16 For discussion see J. L. Dunoff, 'A New Approach to Regime Interaction' in M. A. Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law (2012), 136. 17 See Dunoff, Ibid. 18 Ibid., at 138. 19 we term, the 'socio-legal adaptation' of the aircraft; a type of (re)ordering involving law, legal technicalities and artefacts of legal origin that in this case were focused on ensuring the compatibility of two distinct legal regimes. 23 Thus, socio-legal adaptation reflects a sociological research approach that is open to the complex entanglement of law and the material world, one that is strongly informed by the Actor-Network Theory rejection of explanations of the 'the social' which do not sufficiently account for the role of 'non-humans'. In this guise, the socio-legal includes the material world and by extension 'socio-legal adaptation' should be understood as a re-ordering of the material and social worlds.
Our work is significant as its highlights the role played by legal technicalities in establishing 'jurisdiction' 24 between specialised regimes of international law. 25 Furthermore, it demonstrates the assimilation of aviation into the cause global health security through the instrumentalisation of the aircraft and its crew as facilitators of disease surveillance. Through socio-legal adaptation, uncertainty was (somewhat) diminished and a more coherent governance framework was established for aviation in the context of the Ebola outbreak.
We commence our analysis in section one by detailing how the appearance of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in 2003 produced a paradigm shift in the relationship between aviation and public health. SARS spread to 23 countries in a 23 Drawing on the concept of socio-legal objects, see E. Cloatre, 'Trips and pharmaceutical patents in Djibouti: an ANT analysis of socio-legal objects', (2008) 17 (2) Social & Legal Studies 263, at 263. 24 See generally Valverde, supra note 20. 25 matter of days through international air travel 26 and in one case it was thought that a single passenger infected 22 of 119 passengers. 27 We accompany this discussion by drawing attention to the literature on regime interactions, as well as the potential role of legal technicalities in facilitating coherent interactions between the legal regimes of aviation and global health security respectively.
In section two, we discuss in more detail the role of the technical in securing functional and coherent regime inter-operation. We demonstrate how over time, the legal regimes applicable to the aircraft became better aligned through the employ of artefacts and practices resulting in the social-legal adaptation of the airplane to the threat of communicable disease. This bridging work would, however, come to be tested during the Ebola outbreak.
In section three, we discuss the international response to Ebola and thereby reveal the struggle both within international organisations and the airline industry to contend with the disease. We explore socio-legal adaptations specific to Ebola, all of which aimed to further connect the plane's interior with disease surveillance systems.
In section four, we demonstrate that while legal technicalities can be written off as neutral and uninteresting, they played a significant role in facilitating the ongoing interaction between the applicable regimes of global health and aviation during the Ebola outbreak. Consequently, they were instrumental in developing international law's jurisdiction on-board the plane. Through efforts that included those facilitating regime 26 interactions, some flights would take off during the outbreak. We conclude by drawing five core conclusions from our study.
REGIME INTERACTIONS, INTERLEGALITY AND LEGAL TOOLS
Airports are a physical manifestation of legal regime interoperation. 28 While parked on the runway, the plane exists within the bordered territory of a state and is subject to national laws relating to public health, customs, security and immigration. However, the plane and airport also fall within the scope of multiple international legal regimes including those of the Chicago Convention and IHR (2005) . In this way, the airport and the plane are spaces where international norms and laws cohabit and interact with national and local laws and norms. For the air travel project to succeed and operate smoothly, a multitude of legal regimes must co-function.
The appearance of SARS highlighted the shortcomings of international law by exposing a gap in the interaction of the regimes of international health and international air travel. 29 The disease subsequently drove significant changes in the governance of air transport with respect to infectious diseases. 30 Indeed, such was the magnitude of the 2003 outbreak that it acted as a 'tipping point' 31 for the revision of the IHR (1969) 32 which had been subject to extensive criticism for its inability to deal with new and emerging infectious diseases. Even with the revision of IHR in 2005, however, there was still something of a 'gap' when it came to governing a crucial component of the aviation sector -the interior of the cabin and infected passengers. There were no prescriptions, for example, within the IHR (2005) or the Chicago Convention on the internal characteristics aircraft and the governance of infected passengers on the airplane. 33 From the perspective of the Chicago Convention, the ICAO's reaction to SARS was to recognise that, 'health issues are becoming a consideration for some in their decision to fly or not.' 34 In 2004, to ensure the mobility of planes during public health threats, the ICAO reviewed the compatibility of aviation standards with those of public health. 35 At that time, the Chicago Convention and the (as then draft) IHR (2005) were recognised to be 'generally synergistic, starting with their shared objective of avoiding unnecessary interference with, respectively, air transportation and international traffic.' 36 Despite this, a distinct normative gap between the rationalities underpinning the WHO IHR and 33 It should be noted, however, that the ICAO and WHO had previously worked together on a diverse range of issues including quarantine, disinsectization of aircraft to eradicate vectors of disease, as well as airport health and sanitary facilities. Indeed, the IHR (1969), applicable at the time of SARS, contained a large number of references to aviation and international travel. The public health risks of international air travel were also given specific expression in Article 14 of the Chicago Convention. The extent of collaboration between the ICAO and WHO was such that the ICAO was the only intergovernmental organisation to participate in a 1995 informal WHO consultation on revision of the latter's International Health Regulations. Despite such cooperation, however, in the period before SARS, only limited progress was made in terms of regulating the interior of the aircraft to prevent the spread of communicable sector. 44 This can be contrasted with the Chicago Convention which has traditionally focused on the prevention of accidents and ensuring passenger health and safety. 45 Prior to SARS, the ICAO was mostly interested in the 'human factors' dimension of aviation health 46 with, for example, efforts to ban smoking in-flight 47 derived from ICAO's passenger safety mandate.
In summary, we find two different legal regimes, while sharing the objective of maintaining international travel, are nevertheless epistemically distinct. This distinctiveness highlights a number of challenges which could give rise to governance issues including; functional overlap, 48 normative difference, and the potential for jurisdictional uncertainty. 49 With regards to the latter, for example, we can consider an in-flight incidence of infectious disease as an issue pertaining to international health security. In some circumstances, however, it will be a passenger safety concern. (2015) 19 (2) Journal of International Relations and Development 1, at 10, who argues that, 'the IHR contain no substantial allusion to individual health, the figure of the individual person who is sick and needs care is, for the most part, absent. On the other hand, and even more curiously, the IHR also refrain from concerning themselves with the health of the population...' 45 The preamble to the Chicago Convention states that governments have agreed on 'principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that the international air transport services may be established on a basis of equality of opportunity.' See generally Abeyratne, supra note 34, at 217; commenting that in respect of the aviation context, 'international responsibility in the carriage of persons extends only as far as the obligation to prevent injury, wounding or death, and not to the physical or mental well-being of a person.' 46 Sometimes it will be both. It is therefore necessary to resolve how the two domains of law inter-operate.
Regime interoperation
The wide array of legal regimes governing specific issue areas, often with overlapping competences, has attracted much by way of academic comment. 50 The so-called fragmentation of international law is seen as a response to the increased specialisation and complexity of international affairs. 51 Nonetheless there exists a general presumption against normative conflict in international law. 52 This is given effect through techniques and agreements 53 aimed at ensuring harmonious legal interpretation and elaboration.
At the doctrinal level, rules such as lex posterior and lex specialis have been developed to minimise inter-systemic conflicts between different international treaties. 54 Such rules or techniques may, however, be unsuited to the task of dealing with 'relational interactions' between international regimes which exercise concurrent authority over actions or events. 55 In practice, when decision makers encounter regime conflicts, 'they tend to be resolved in ad hoc political bargains rather than by an application of 50 To understand the workings or the machinery of jurisdiction Valverde suggests, 'turning-away from high theory and toward the 'technicalities' of law'. 67 Riles also helps us towards an analytical posture from where the mechanics of inter-treaty regime interactions can be appreciated and analyzed from a legal perspective. Her work illuminates the role of the technical, directing attention to the mundane tools of law. 68 According to Riles, legal technicalities are perceived as being, 'only a tool, nothing more, and can be used by anyone anywhere for any purpose.' 69 In this sense, legal technique is inherently practical; it is a 'series of problem-solving methods, as opposed to theories, a way of disposing of actual regulatory problems, or disputes, or legal puzzles.' 70 Because of this problem-solving focus, together with (the appearance at least of) political neutrality, legal technicalities are capable of being deployed regardless of their contextual setting. Furthermore, the obviousness of their function often means that lawyers fail to appreciate their importance. 71 Riles suggests that legal technicalities include everything from legal actors, problem solving paradigms, ideologies, the form of technical legal doctrine and argumentation. 72 Far from being inert, they often produce effects through material artefacts and practices. 73 Bringing such effects into view also allows us to see the potential of the 67 Ibid., at 153. 68 technical to act as a protagonist, not merely as a tool that faithfully mediates the intent of its user. 74 Rather than choosing between 'ad hoc political bargains' or the 'application of blackletter principles' to provide an account of the encounter of multiple treaty regimes, this study introduces the role played of legal technicalities. We examine how they feature in facilitating interactions between the legal regimes of aviation and global health security respectively. This untold story of international law -the role of the technical in securing coherent and synergistic regime interactions -contributes to the growing literature on relational regime interactions.
In the remainder of our paper, we use the term legal technicalities and legal tools interchangeably when in keeping with Riles' definition. We refer to the materials that legal technicalities act through as legal artefacts; the quasi-legal objects or what Cloatre calls socio-legal objects. 75
A TALE OF THE TECHNICAL
As demonstrated above, SARS drew attention to uncertainty at the international level on how to deal with the threat of infectious disease spread by air travel. Responding to such concerns would require 'bridging work' between the applicable regimes. In this section, we discuss the form and function of such bridging work, paying particular attention to the role of the technical therein. As we will show, the legal technicalities employed to perform regime bridging work operated under a presumption of 74 See Riles, supra note 19, at 985. 75 Cloatre, supra note 23, at 263. compatibility. 76 These technicalities included the doctrinal technique of instrumental cross-referencing 77 through to the use of institutional coordination linkages. 78 By dint of these legal tools, the governance of infected airline passengers could be progressively integrated into the existing legal orders.
As we elucidate below, the resulting interactions between the ICAO and WHO were juris-generative, 79 and resulted in the elaboration of 'new international norms' 80 for air travel during public health emergencies. 81 Accordingly, over time, the legal regimes applicable to the craft became better aligned through the development of artefacts and practices that resulted in the social-legal adaptation of the airplane to the threat of communicable disease. However, as we discuss in section three, this arrangement came under strain with the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014.
Close Encounters of a Regime Kind: Cross-referencing and coordination linkages
Cross-referencing may operate as a simple legal technique to ensure and promote the reconciliation of overlapping legal domains. 82 In addition to bolstering coherence claims, cross-referencing may create a presumption of compatibility between the norms and policies of connected regimes. 83 In the aftermath of SARS, the legal technique of cross-referencing was utilised by the ICAO through its enactment of a series of updates to its Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) 84 injury. This notification process was intended to bring the aircraft within the IHR's 98 Chicago Convention, Ann. 9, Appendix 13; Amendment 20 to Ann. 9 -Facilitation; for background on its introduction, see www.icao.int/Meetings/AMC/MA/Assembly%2036th%20Session/wp022_en.pdf. 99 [were] to complete a passenger locator card.' 109 While cabin air is recirculated, it is also filtered to reduce the risk of disease spread. 110 The downward flow of filtered air created by a standard ventilation system invisibly segregates symptomatic passengers so that the Passenger Locator Form was only required in a two seat radius of the symptomatic passenger. 111 Through these interactions, new boundaries for sorting and segregating were established with the guidance positioning materials and practices around bodily fluids. As a result, the interior of the aircraft became progressively engaged with the IHR (2005) and its surveillance processes.
The above socio-legal adaption not only linked two seemingly distinct legal domains but also further enrolled the private sector via the IATA. The legal 'fault lines' of this cooperation were, however, apparent. As the IATA made clear, '(t)he development and execution of measures to combat public health emergencies are the responsibility of states through their public health authorities, not airlines. ' Accordingly, the combination of these seemingly mundane legal tools and practices has led to, 'fundamental epistemological shifts' 114 whereby the rationalities underpinning the system of global health security are increasingly being de-territorialised and applied to aviation. As such, this demonstrates how the 'global binary' whereby health security is separated from other fields is diminishing, 115 as a wider array actors are assimilated into the field of global health security. 116
Summations
Cross referencing and coordination linkages between the legal regimes of the WHO, ICAO and IATA and others led to the development of materials, procedures and processes which in themselves performed bridging work between the relevant regimes.
This facilitated the socio-legal adaptation of the aircraft; namely, the import of protocols and the Universal Precaution Kit into the aircraft cabin. These socio-legal objects assisted in the constitution of international law's jurisdiction; that is, the operation of different legal regimes and their boundaries. 117 Among other things, this helped to resolve how surveillance (IHR) and safety (ICAO) efforts could co-exist. Under this, the IHR was hierarchically superior in that its emphasis on preparedness and surveillance drove these relational interactions. However, such hierarchy was informal in that the norms from one regime -that of the WHO/IHR -were implemented through the receiving regime -the ICAO/Chicago Convention. It was, for example, the ICAO which pushed for the development of CAPSCA to increase collaboration between various actors concerned with the overlap of public health and aviation. 118 Finally, while these socio-legal adaptations were largely intended to adapt the aircraft to the rationalities of global health security, 119 the arrangements were at best a work in progress with CAPSCA a long way off having all contracting States of the ICAO as members. 120 However, it is also the case that without the uneasy alignment of extended networks, the generic plane might struggle to operate during an infectious disease outbreak. Indeed, as Latour remarked on the extended nature of networks, 'Boeing 747s do not fly, airlines fly.' 121 We will now examine the impact of Ebola on these socio-legal adaptations to understand how they held up during an actual outbreak. would be revoked. 129 Air France received directions from Paris requesting them to end their services to the countries affected by Ebola, and the airline's staff also signed a petition calling on their employer to avoid Ebola-hit countries for their own safety. 130 Emirates airline cancelled flights stating that 'the safety of our passengers and crew is of the highest priority and will not be compromised.' 131 Aircrew clearly played a key role in highlighting the risk of inflight transmission. They saw existing standards; the socio-legal adaptations described above, as being insufficient and lacking in detail. The US Association of Flight Attendants, for instance, lobbied federal aviation authorities to adopt a more defined check-list for the safety of their members. 132 In other words, they were pushing for certainty. European transfer hub and then a separate reservation from that EU hub onward). In those cases -the PNR will not show the true origin and the carrier boarding the person at the EU hub will have no access to up-line data. We therefore believe that such passenger data requirements are invariably disproportionate to the potential benefits they could derive. 148 Companies with passenger data processed in the EU, it was claimed, would be legally prohibited from providing PNR data to third countries without a specific data protection agreement in place. 149 Moreover, data transfer would typically be restricted to a caseby-case basis. 150 In this context, the Traveller Public Health Declaration Form can be understood as a substitute for PNR data sharing, a confessional space for the passenger to provide all of the data needed for effective contact tracing. 151 It could capture data on journeys with multiple flights and not just those coming directly from countries enduring an outbreak by asking passengers to, 147 IATA, supra note 112, at 2. 148 See Ibid. 149 Ibid., at 3. 150 Ibid. See also European Commission, supra note 144, at 25 -26. 151 In this sense, the form is concerned with the 'sins of the flesh', in contrast to thermoscanning which desires to know the 'sins by the flesh'; see discussion Opitz, supra note 44, at 12. 
EBOLA SOCIO-LEGAL ADAPTATION

Summations
The complex arrangements discussed above required an uneasy alliance between many different actors working through the multilateral space of CAPSCA. As a collaborative arrangement, CAPSCA came into existence as a response to legal diversity and specialisation. All actors engaged in this space were united through problem-driven governance toward the shared goal of the mobility of the aircraft during an outbreak of 152 See ICAO, 'Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data, supra note 146. infectious disease. While rooted in compromise, this did not mean that the norms, rationalities or obligations of the IHR, the Chicago Convention, and the private sector regimes would automatically co-function. Even with the changes articulated above, not all private sector operators recommenced flights. In other words, while efforts such as the Traveller Public Health Declaration Form were representative of attempts to facilitate regime interoperation, there was contingency to such efforts. Nevertheless, they provide a snapshot of the use of legal tools and artefacts to facilitate regime interaction; a cumulative process with its origins in the SARS outbreak.
TRANSLATIONS
Infectious disease can be a fearsome teacher and the events of SARS brought attention to how globalised travel can hasten the spread of disease internationally. It also highlighted the existence of a regime 'gap' as the regimes of global public health and aviation provided insufficient guidance on how the generic infected passenger should be governed. Efforts after SARS to close that gap are still ongoing and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa provided a further punctuation point to these processes.
The existence of a gap between the Chicago Convention and the IHR was not an instance of conflict within international law. At the doctrinal level, there are rules of the conflict of laws aimed at minimising or avoiding intra-systemic conflicts between different international treaties using rules to assert jurisdictional hierarchy, e.g. lex specialis.
These would not, however, have addressed the regime overlap at play when dealing with infectious disease spread via air travel. What was required instead was a synergistic and coherent response aimed at addressing a common concern; that of ensuring the mobility of the airplane during an infectious disease outbreak.
The fragmentation of international law leads to questions of how different regimes avoid and resolve conflict as well as how they interact to address issues of common concern. Scholarship on relational interactions has acknowledged that particular regimes can 'exercise concurrent authority over actions or events' and hence, are often focused on 'the articulation of new international norms to prospectively govern behaviour within a particular area of international relations.' 153 Here, quite clearly, we are dealing with a similar concern; two regimes with concurrent authority over a particular issue. What our study revealed was the importance of legal technicalities in this process.
This technical work, designed to facilitate regime interoperation, provided scaffolding for regime bridging work at particular legal scales. Ebola, for instance, was classified as being of 'international concern', resulting in the IHR and Chicago interacting to provide detailed standards for this international scale. At the same time, Ebola can be interpreted through a more local legal scale, such as the health and safety concern for particular airline crew or public health risk at the national level in unaffected states.
Rather than looking into how these local, national and international scales are sorted, flight cancellations exposed the struggle of the international legal regime to even feature in this aspect of the governance of communicable disease outbreaks. Accordingly, while legal technicalities can be written off as neutral and unworthy of further attention, they played a significant role in defining international law's jurisdiction and in facilitating the ongoing interaction between the applicable regimes.
The resultant regime interactions did not of course produce full compliance with the WHO's recommendations; not all flights recommenced and, as we saw, there was also pushback by the private sector. However, it is also clear that the ongoing interactions between the applicable regimes helped facilitate an increasingly coherent set of standards for supporting the goals of global health security.
CONCLUSIONS
Much has been written on the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa with a particular focus on the ineffectiveness of the WHO response. 156 We have not wished to supplement this already comprehensive literature. Our study was prompted by an interest in the cancellation of flights to the affected region despite an authoritative consensus to the contrary. While there has been some work looking at how best to hold to account states which enact disproportionate trade and travel 155 Valverde, supra note 20. 156 which has shown how mundane legal tools exert their own agency, thereby making them worthy of greater attention. 160 Far from inert, they ought to be factored in when considering the international response to an outbreak or other complex multi-sectoral concerns. Our exposition of the technical in securing coherent and synergistic regime interactions further contributes to the growing literature on relational regime interactions.
From the foregoing analysis, we wish to draw five significant conclusions. The first is the idea that efforts to respond to Ebola and, indeed infectious disease more generally, by necessity implicate 'the legal.' It is present in how disease is measured, monitored and addressed. In the context of our study, such legal work included the operation of legal technicalities and deployment of objects to facilitate the inter-operation of the IHR 157 See, for example, WHO, supra note 38, 12. 158 See generally Riles, supra note 19, at 973. 159 Valverde, supra note 20, at 139. 160 Cloatre, supra note 21, at 97. rationalities, the creation of coordination linkages helped to resolve their functional overlap as well as mediating the participation of the private sector. Through this arrangement, the ensuing production of legal practices and objects contributed to the adaption of the aircraft to outbreaks.
Second, the adaptation of the aircraft to address the threat posed by communicable diseases is part of an on-going, complex modification of sanitary frontiers. We demonstrated how the production of the Traveller Public Health Declaration Form and specialised kits brought the private sector more firmly into the fold of bordering processes and the surveillance regime underpinning global health security. They were now engaged directly in the separation and 'social sorting' 161 of the sick from the healthy between national frontiers. This assimilation also has the effect of instrumentalising aircrew and the aircraft as tools of disease surveillance.
Third, the adaptations that occurred post-SARS did not flow from a single international legal regime or from a plurality of legal regimes with a clear hierarchy. Rather, hierarchy was emergent; a function, among other things, of the hybrid space of CAPSCA which worked to bridge two specialised regimes of law. Our article fits within the wider international law literature on relational regime interactions and demonstrates how such interactions may not flow from a normative or singular hierarchical source. Rather, they may encompass a range of actors and norms within a highly plural legal space; a decentralized operative legality. 162 preparedness. In this context jurisdiction, that is, the question of which regime operates where and when, is compostable, contingent and not dependent on doctrinal legal hierarchy. Thus, in the context of the Ebola, when the private sector expressed reluctance to take on duties traditionally borne by departure and arrival states, we saw how the assemblage giving rise to jurisdiction could unravel.
Fourth, in our focus on legal technicalities, we found that tools really do matter 163 when it comes to regime interactions. Legal technicalities and artefacts were at the forefront of public health efforts at ensuring the mobility of international flights. The inclusion of additional public health procedures and forms as well as the Universal Precaution Kit -a box the size of a suitcase -were legally charged artefacts aimed at the lifting of restrictions on flights during the height of an outbreak. Thus, regime interactions and the legal technicalities they implicate are an overlooked but integral feature of global health governance. Our findings may have value for other areas of international law and help to revise theoretical accounts of how international legal regimes interface. 164 Fifth, we found that the aircraft is a site of legal contestation. Tensions were revealed between the intersections of legal systems. These were particularly prevalent when it came to the collection and handling of passenger data and were only partly resolved by the bridging work performed between the regimes. This reveals a legal plurality within the constitutive assemblage of global health security; a finding which has significant implications for the development of international responses to infectious disease.
